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Introduction 
Is there a “culture war” in the United States? If so, what it is it about? 
Political scientists tend to treat the “culture war” thesis as media hype. Polls, they point out, 
consistently show that the vast majority of citizens rank societal welfare—economic prosperity, 
national security, the quality of the environment, and the like—ahead of “moral values” when 
asked to identify issues of political importance (Fiorina 2005). 
At the same, time, what people believe government should do to promote societal welfare is 
undeniably correlated with their cultural outlooks. Most citizens might be less concerned about 
whether the government should ban flag burning than whether it should do something about 
global warming; about whether state judges should be permitted to display the Ten Command-
ments in their courtrooms than whether workers should be afforded a higher minimum wage; 
about whether men should be allowed to marry other men than about whether the U.S. should 
send more men (and women) to Iraq. But it turns out that individuals’ positions on the former set 
of so-called symbolic, cultural issues strongly predicts what they think about the latter set of ma-
terial, non-cultural ones (Kahan & Braman 2006).  
Most of us, in fact, are perfectly aware of this connection. When we reflect on controversial 
policy positions—“the death penalty doesn’t deter murder”; “climate change is a natural, cyclical 
phenomenon”; “gun control will reduce violent crime”; “the minimum wage will lead to unem-
ployment and ultimately hurt the poor”—we don’t think of them as being merely right or wrong. 
We also instantly recognize them as the sort of things “people like them” assert or deny; they are 
beliefs that our close associates tend to have unified position on—the challenging of which could 
actually cost us their friendship. 
So even if the political scientists are right about what citizens really want, there still is a cul-
ture war in American politics. It’s not so much about whether law should reflect “our” values or 
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“theirs” but about whose view of the facts—”ours” or “theirs”—societal welfare policies of vari-
ous sorts should be based on. 
Understanding this peculiar cultural war of facts and trying to assess what might be done to 
broker peace in it are the motivating aims of the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School. 
This report describes the results of a series of surveys and experiments, conducted over a nine-
month period and involving some 5,000 Americans, that bear on these matters. 
Cultural Cognition: Theory and Empirical Testing 
The “cultural cognition thesis” asserts that people’s beliefs about risk are shaped by their 
core values. Because of a combination of interrelated psychological dynamics, individuals con-
form their views about what sorts of activities endanger societal welfare, and what sorts of poli-
cies effectively combat those dangers, to their cultural evaluation of those activities (Kahan & 
Braman 2006). 
The theory of cultural cognition rests 
on a parsimonious framework for classify-
ing individuals’ cultural values. This 
framework (patterned on Douglas, 1970) 
characterizes “cultural worldviews,” or 
preferences for how to organize society, 
along two cross-cutting axes: “hierarchy-
egalitarianism” and “individualism-comm-
unitarianism.” People who subscribe to a 
“hierarchical” worldview believe that 
rights, duties, goods, and offices should be 
distributed differentially and on the basis 
of clearly defined and stable social charac-
teristics (e.g., gender, wealth, lineage, eth-
nicity). Those who subscribe to an “egali-
tarian” worldview believe that rights, duties, goods, and offices should be distributed equally and 
without regard to such characteristics. People who subscribe to a “communitarian” worldview 
believe that societal interests should take precedence over individual ones and that society should 
bear the responsibility for securing the conditions of individual flourishing. Those who subscribe 
to an “individualistic” worldview believe that individuals should secure the conditions of their 
own flourishing without collective interference or assistance.1 
Hierarchy
Equality 
Individual 
Hierarchist
Egalitarian
CommunitarianIndividualist
Using this framework, researchers affiliated with the Cultural Cognition Project found in the 
First National Risk and Culture Study (2004) that beliefs about societal risks are distributed 
across persons in patterns consistent with the cultural cognition thesis (Kahan et al. 2007a). Ega-
                                       
1 Our studies measure individuals’ worldviews with two attitudinal scales (Kahan et al. 2007a). For ease of exposi-
tion, we refer to persons as either “egalitarians” or “hierarchs,” and either “individualists” or “communitarians,” 
depending on where their worldview scores fall in relation to the average on the relevant scale. This framework, of 
course, is only one representation of people’s cultural values; “worldviews” are more numerous, and more complex, 
than this. The value of the parsimonious scheme we use, however, is that it makes it possible to characterize indi-
vidual differences in a tractable way that enables relatively straightforward empirical testing of how values interact 
with risk perceptions. 
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litarians and communitarians, for example, worry about environmental risks (nuclear power ac-
cidents, global warming, air pollution, etc.), the abatement of which would justify regulating 
commercial activities that generate inequality and legitimize the unconstrained pursuit of indi-
vidual self-interest. Individualists, in contrast, reject claims of environmental risk precisely be-
cause they cherish markets and private orderings. They worry instead that excessive gun control 
will render individuals unable to defend themselves—a belief congenial to the association of 
guns with individualist virtues such as self-reliance, courage, and martial prowess. Hierarchs fret 
about the societal risks of drug use and promiscuous sex, and the personal risks associated with 
obtaining an abortion or smoking marijuana—forms of behavior that denigrate traditional social 
norms and roles. 
The Second National Risk and Culture Study was commenced in late December 2006 and 
continued through early September 2007. During this time, researchers administered a series of 
surveys and experiments to a nationally representative sample of some 5,000 persons, who par-
ticipated in these studies through on-line testing facilities.2 
The Study had two aims. The first was to identify the discrete social and psychological me-
chanisms through which cultural worldviews shape individuals’ beliefs about risk and related 
issues. The second was to determine what sorts of techniques for providing information might 
counteract or neutralize cultural cognition. The aim of such techniques isn’t to promote the for-
mation of any particular set of beliefs. Rather it is to enable citizens who agree that they should 
not be using the law to impose one or another cultural group’s values on the others to avoid do-
ing that unwittingly as they deliberate about what policies promote society’s material welfare. 
Issues and Studies 
1. Global Warming 
Cultural Polarization Generally 
The global warming debate turns a host of factual issues: Is the temperature of the earth re-
ally increasing? Are humans the cause of any such change in the earth’s temperature? Does cli-
mate change pose a threat to human health and prosperity? Beliefs on these facts, however, are 
distributed in patterns that reflect citizens’ values. Replicating evidence from the First Study, the 
Second found that cultural worldviews accurately predict who is global warming skeptic and 
who a true believer: hierarchs and individualists tend to dismiss the claim that global warming is 
occurring and is serious threat to our society, whereas egalitarians and communitarians take the 
opposite view. 
 
 
 
 
                                       
2 The nature of the sample and the study methods is discussed in greater detail in Appendix A. 
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How much risk does global warming pose for people in our society?
 
Individuals’ worldviews, we 
found, explained individuals’ beliefs 
about global warming more power-
fully than any other individual char-
acteristic. How liberal or conserva-
tive people are, for example, ex-
plains less than one-third as much of 
variance in such beliefs as how 
egalitarian or hierarchical and how 
communitarian or individualistic 
they are. Whether one is a man or a 
woman—a characteristic known to 
influence environmental risk percep-
tions generally—explains than one-
tenth as much. 
Global Warming Risk Perception Multivariate Regression Model
 Female  .053***  
 Black -.032  
 Other Minority  .107***  
 Age  .080***  
 Income  .001  
 Education -.048**  
 Republican -.118***  
 Independent -.015  
 Conservative -.106***  
 Trust in Govt -.064***  
 Individualism -.093***  
 Hierarchy -.165***  
 R2  .26  
N ≈ 1700. Semi-partial regression coefficients. Dependent variable: 
GWRISK. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10. 
 
Nuclear Power Makes Hierarchs and Individualists See Green 
We also devoted considerable attention to figuring out precisely why culture exerts this ef-
fect, and whether anything might be done to counteract the resulting cultural polarization on 
global warming beliefs. We conducted an experiment, the results of which show that the impact 
of culture on the processing of factual information on climate change is highly conditional what 
sort of policy people anticipate will be used to address it.  
In the experiment, subjects were supplied with one of two versions of a newspaper article 
reporting a study by a group of scientific experts. In both versions, the report was described as 
finding that the temperature of the earth is increasing, that humans are the source of this condi-
tion, and that this change in the earth’s climate could have disastrous environmental economic 
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consequences. In one, however, the scientific report was described as calling for “increased anti-
pollution regulation,” whereas in another it was described as calling for “revitalization of the na-
tion’s nuclear power industry.” 
 
The results of the experiment showed that subjects receiving the “nuclear power” version of 
the article were less culturally polarized than ones receiving the “anti-pollution” version. That is, 
individualists and hierarchs who received the “nuclear power” version were less inclined to dis-
miss the facts related by the described report—that the earth’s temperature was increasing, that 
humans were the cause, and that the consequences would be dire if global warming were not re-
versed—than were individualists and hierarchs who got the “antipollution” version, even though 
the factual information, and its source, were the same in both articles. Indeed, individualists and 
hierarchs who received the “antipollution” version of the news report were even more skeptical 
about these facts than were hierarchs and individualists in a control group that received no news-
paper story—and thus no information relating to the scientific report that made these findings. 
We anticipated these results based on a dynamic known as “identity-protective” cognition 
(Kahan et al. 2007a). As a way of avoiding dissonance and estrangement from valued groups, 
individuals subconsciously resist factual information that threatens their defining values. This 
defensive response can be reversed or mitigated when information is instead framed in a manner 
that affirms those same commitments (Cohen et al. 2000; Cohen et al. in press).  
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Experiment Condition 
n ≈ 160 per condition. Global warming risk perception measured with 4-point scale *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ 
.10 for differences in means across conditions. 
The “anti-pollution” and “nuclear” versions framed the factual information in the report in a 
“threatening” and “affirming” way, respectively, for individuals culturally predisposed to dismiss 
global warming risks. Hierarchs and individualists tend to resist information on environmental 
risks, the former because it seems to imply restriction of market activity and the latter because it 
implicitly challenges governmental and business elites (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Kahan et al. 
2007a). The demand for greater “anti-pollution controls” accentuates these connotations, and 
thus increases the disposition of these persons to dismiss information relating to global warming. 
Individualists and hierarchs, however, support nuclear power development, which is a symbol of 
industrial markets, human mastery over nature, and the power and competence of scientific and 
industrial elites. Accordingly, when they are told that increased investment in nuclear power is 
the appropriate response to global warming, individuals with these orientations are less threat-
ened. As a result they are more willing to accept the factual claims that suggest that global 
warming is really a problem (Kahan et al. 2006). 
2. Guns  
Cultural Polarization Generally 
The gun control debate features competing claims about risk. On the one hand, there’s the 
concern of gun control supporters that too few restrictions on private gun ownership will lead to 
accidents and violent crime. On the other, there’s the concern of gun control opponents who wor-
ry that too many restrictions will prevent law-abiding citizens from defending themselves (Kahan 
& Braman 2003). 
In the First National Risk and Culture Study, we found evidence that individuals’ cultural 
outlooks determine which of these risks they take more seriously. Hierarchs tend to favorably 
associate guns with hierarchical roles such as father, protector, and with respected hierarchical 
institutions like the military; individualists favorably associate them with virtues like self-
reliance and courage. Consistent with identity-protective cognition, persons with these values 
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worry more about the risk of defenselessness. This is especially true for men who hold these cul-
tural outlooks. Egalitarians, who associate guns with racial animus and sexism, and communi-
tarians, who see private weapon ownership as symbols of distrust and lack of concern for others, 
worry more about the risk of gun accidents and gun violence (Kahan et al. 2007a). 
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How much risk does private gun ownership pose for people in our 
society?
 
In the Second National Risk and Culture Study, we found these patterns persist. People still 
divide over the risks of gun ownership based on their cultural orientations, which in fact exert 
considerably more influence than do 
other sorts of factors (thirteen times 
as much as ideology, four times as 
much as race, and two times as 
much as gender, for example). 
Post- Virginia Tech 
The terrible shooting massacre 
that killed 32 students at Virginia 
Tech occurred during the course of 
our study. Predictably, gun control 
proponents cited the incident as evi-
dence of the need for greater restric-
tions on firearms (Brady Campaign 
2007), while opponents countered 
that existing firearms restrictions on school and university campuses had disarmed students who 
might have cut the tragic attack short (Lott 2007). 
Gun-Risk Perception Multivariate Regression Model 
Female    .136*** 
Black    .094*** 
Other Minority   .108*** 
Age    .029 
Income    .014 
Education   -.013 
Republican   -.073*** 
Independent    .007 
Conservative   -.055*** 
Trust in Govt    .077*** 
Individualism   -.142*** 
Hierarchy    -.136*** 
R2    .25 
N ≈ 1800. Semi-partial regression coefficients. Dependent variable is 
GUNOWN. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10. 
We conducted a 1,500-person national survey after the incident to see whether individuals’ 
cultural worldviews influence which position they take on this question. We found that, indeed, 
members of the American public are culturally divided on the effect of regulation guns on school 
campuses, too. Communitarians (66%) and egalitarians (68%) predominantly reject the claim 
that “strict gun control laws make it harder for potential victims of shootings at schools and uni-
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versities to protect themselves”; not so for Hierarchs and Individualists, majorities of whom 
(59% and 56%, respectively) reject the notion that “stricter gun control laws would on the whole 
increase safety of students at schools and universities.”  
 
“Strict gun control laws make it 
harder for potential victims of shoot-
ings at schools and universities to pro-
tect themselves.” 
  
“Stricter gun control laws 
would on the whole increase 
safety of students at schools 
and universities.” 
 
  Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
U.S. Population 41% 58%  54% 46% 
Hierarchs 49% 50%  41% 59% 
Egalitarians 31% 68%   68% 31% 
Communitarians 33% 66%  64% 35% 
Individualists 48% 51%   44% 56% 
N = 1,520. Margin of error ≈ +/- 2.5% 
 
We also found that in the wake of the incident, the breakdown of Americans who support 
and oppose stricter gun regulation was essentially unchanged from what it had been when we 
conducted our initial National Risk and Culture Study some three years ago. This finding is con-
sistent with ones that showed no movement in public opinion on gun control after the Columbine 
massacre in 1999 (Smith 2000). One reason this might be so is that individuals of opposing cul-
tural persuasions draw exactly the opposite conclusions from such an event (Kahan & Braman 
2003). Our findings of cultural polarization on the impact of gun regulation on school and uni-
versity campuses supports this hypothesis. 
 
Persistence of Cultural Polarization on Gun Control After 
Virginia Tech 
 
“I favor stronger gun control laws.” 
 
 2004 July 2007 
 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
U.S. Population 61% 39%  59% 40% 
Hierarchs 48% 54%  46% 54% 
Egalitarians 78% 22%   74% 25% 
Communitarians 73% 27%  72% 28% 
Individualists 52% 48%   48% 52% 
N = 1,520. Margin of error ≈ +/- 2.5% 
 
3. Nanotechnology 
The asserted risks of climate change and gun ownership are familiar. So is the cultural com-
plexion of public disputes surrounding these assertions.  
Second National Risk and Culture Study Page 9 
The risks surrounding nanotechnology, however, are not at all familiar and have not, as of 
yet, generated significant public dispute, cultural or otherwise. The Cultural Cognition Project, in 
collaboration with the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Center for Scholars, designed a study of nanotechnology risk perceptions to assess how 
cultural cognition influences the formation of attitudes toward novel risks (Kahan et al. 2007b). 
In particular, that study was designed to assess whether cultural worldviews influence the 
processing of risk information. Biased assimilation refers to the disposition of persons to notice 
and credit evidence in a selective fashion that affirms their predispositions. When this dynamic is 
at work, individuals of diverse values don’t converge but instead polarize when exposed to a 
common body of information on some disputed factual issue (Lord et al. 1979). 
We divided a diverse sample of 1,800 individuals into two groups. Because we anticipated 
that the vast majority (as it turned out, some 80%) would not have previously heard very much 
about nanotechnology, we supplied members of both groups with a brief description of what 
nanotechnology is (“a relatively new form of science that involves the ability to measure, see, 
predict and make things on the extremely small scale of atoms and molecules”). One set of sub-
jects (the “no information” group) was furnished with no additional information, while the other 
(the “information-exposed group”) was instructed to read two paragraphs that presented balanced 
information on the potential risks and benefits of nanotechnology. Members of both groups were 
then asked to indicate their beliefs about the relative size of these risks and benefits. 
Comparisons of their 
responses showed that in-
formation polarized subjects 
along cultural lines. In the 
“no information” group, 
there were no significant dif-
ferences in beliefs among 
hierarchs and egalitarians or 
among individualists and 
communitarians. But in the 
“information-exposed group,” egalitarians and communitarians were significantly more con-
cerned with the risks of nanotechnology relative to its benefits than were hierarchs and individu-
alists. The subjects, in sum, had assimilated the information in a biased fashion that reflected 
their cultural predispositions toward environmental risks (like global warming and nuclear 
power) generally. 
 Mean Nanotechnology Risk Perception 
 No Information  Information Exposed 
Hierarchs 2.64  2.72* 
Egalitarians 2.67  2.58* 
Individualists 2.62   2.73** 
Communitarians 2.70   2.54** 
N ≈ 1,800. Risk perception is risk vs. benefit measured on a four-point scale . 
* denotes differences in differences of means of opposing groups  across con-
ditions significant at p ≤ .10, ** significant at p ≤ .05. 
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This study, then, 
generated two 
important con-
clusions. One 
was that cultural 
worldviews play 
a critical role in 
determining not 
just how indi-
viduals assess 
information 
about familiar 
and already con-
troversial risks 
but unfamiliar 
and as-yet un-
politicized risks 
as well. Another 
was that 
nanotechnology might well emerge as another culturally divisive risk issue as the public learns 
more and more about it. 
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4. Mandatory HPV Vaccination  
The FDA recently approved a vaccine that would inoculate girls and women against infec-
tion by the human papillomavirus (HPV). HPV infection is sexually transmitted disease and is 
the leading cause of cervical cancer. The CDC recommends vaccination at a relatively young age 
(11-12), before the onset of sexual activity that can lead to HPV exposure and infection (at which 
point the vaccine is ineffective). A political debate has started to emerge over whether govern-
ment (through public schools or other agencies) should mandate HPV vaccination for all young 
girls. 
The HPV-vaccine debate—like the gun debate—features competing risk claims. Proponents 
argue that the failure to administer mass vaccinations will lead to continuing widespread infec-
tion and correspondingly high rates of cervical cancer. Opponents argue that the vaccination, by 
eliminating the risk of one common STD, might induce young women to engage in unprotected 
sex and thus increase their risk of contracting other diseases, including HIV-AIDS. They also 
raise concerns about potential unforeseen side effects from the vaccination (Gibbs 2006).  
Moreover, the policy of mandatory HPV vaccination seems to touch on a variety of issues of 
cultural import: from premarital sex to parental autonomy, from individual choice to the power 
of the state to control medical decisions. One might expect, then, that individuals will resolve 
competing factual claims about the risks of HPV in a manner that affirms rather than threatens 
their cultural worldviews. 
At the same time, the risks associated with HPV—like those associated with nanotechnol-
ogy—are relatively novel. As a result, many members of the public are unlikely to have an intui-
tive or emotional response to the issue informed by their cultural affiliations. For that reason, the 
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advent of the HPV vaccination debate supplies another opportunity to investigate the discrete 
mechanisms through which culture operates to shape risk perceptions on new issues.  
Biased Assimilation and Polarization 
To that end, we constructed a multi-part experimental study. The first had the same aim as 
our nanotechnology study: to determine whether individuals’ cultural predispositions biases how 
they process information on a relatively novel risk. We divided 500 subjects into two groups: one 
that received no information about the policy of mandatory vaccination of school-age girls other 
than it was being proposed (the “no argument” group); and another that was instructed to read 
opposing arguments relating to the policy (“argument” group). Both groups of subjects were 
asked to indicate their beliefs about various facts relating to the policy (including its asserted 
benefits in reducing the incidence of cervical cancer, its possible unanticipated side-effects, and 
its contribution to the propensity of vaccinated females to have unprotected sex). 
We again found that 
subjects exposed to informa-
tion polarized along cultural 
lines relative to ones who 
were not. Even in the “no 
argument” condition, indi-
vidualists and hierarchs 
rated the potential risks of 
the policy as being slightly 
higher, and the potential 
benefits lower, than did 
communitarians and egalitarians. But in the “argument” condition, these disparities in risk-
benefit perceptions were significantly more pronounced. 
 Mean HPV Vaccine Risk Perception 
 No Argument  Arguments 
Hierarchs 2.43   3.03** 
Egalitarians 2.19   2.63** 
Individualists 2.37  2.95* 
Communitarians 2.25  2.67* 
n ≈ 250 per condition. Risk perception is risk vs. benefit measured on a four-
point scale. * denotes differences between differences in differences of means 
of opposing groups across conditions significant at p ≤ .10, ** significant at p 
≤ .05. 
Culture and Credibility 
Next we conducted an experiment to see whether the perceived cultural values of argument 
advocates would make a difference. We started by creating four culturally identifiable “policy 
experts”: individuals who, based on their pictures and mock CVs, were perceived by pretest sub-
jects as holding one or another of the worldviews featured in the cultural cognition theory. We 
then asked 800 completely new subjects to indicate what they thought about the risks and bene-
fits of the HPV vaccine after reading the balanced arguments, which were now randomly as-
signed to debating pairs of culturally identifiable experts. 
We found that policy advocates’ perceived cultural worldviews can indeed significantly ac-
centuate or mute cultural polarization. Where an egalitarian advocate defended mandatory vacci-
nation and a hierarchal advocate opposed it (“expected alignment” condition), the gulf between 
egalitarian and hierarchical subjects widened. The same was true of the gap between communi-
tarians and individualists when advocates sharing their identities took the pro- and con- posi-
tions, respectively. 
But when the advocate-argument alignments were reversed—that is when a hierarchal or an 
individualist expert defended mandatory vaccination against an egalitarian or communitarian ex-
pert who opposed it (“unexpected alignment” condition)—polarization shrunk. Indeed, individu-
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alists and communitarians in this “unexpected alignment” condition actually swapped places: 
now communitarians displayed greater concern for the risks of the HPV-vaccination policy (al-
though the difference between the two groups’ was small and not statistically significant in that 
condition; in effect, polarization along this dimension had disappeared). Clearly, the cultural 
identity of advocates is an in-
credibly powerful mechanism—
one that rivals the power that pre-
dispositions have on information 
processing—in the cultural cogni-
tion of risk.  
The inversion of the align-
ment between advocate identity 
and arguments need not be this 
complete in order to counter po-
larization. We found that polari-
zation was also small (relative to 
that in the “argument” and “ex-
pected alignment” conditions) 
among subjects in what we called 
the “voucher” condition. Each 
subject in that condition had ob-
served a debate among advocates who both shared that subject’s worldview. Accordingly, only 
one of the two debating experts in this condition was taking a position contrary to the stance nor-
mally associated with his (and the subject’s) perceived values. 
Hierarchist
Egalitarian
CommunitarianIndividualist
Culturally Identifiable Advocates
The diminishment of polarization in this condition is an important finding. People in the real 
world won’t encounter many examples of debates in which there is a radical inversion of the cul-
tural identities of advocates and the cultural resonances of the arguments they are making. But 
they might well see examples of advocates whose values they share taking unexpected positions 
in debates with others of their own persuasion. The conservative Governor of Texas, for exam-
ple, surprised many of his ideological peers when he came out in favor of mandatory HPV vac-
cinations (Elliott 2007). When individuals see that even some persons who hold their values are 
willing to take such a position—to “vouch” for that position as acceptable for someone with their 
values to hold—they are less likely to form the subconscious impression that taking such a view 
will estrange them from their peers. In that state, they are more likely to consider the merits of an 
argument that runs contrary to their cultural predispositions. 
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5. Terrorism and National Security 
How large the risk of domestic terrorism is—and how effective restrictions of domestic civil 
liberties, foreign wars, and other policies aimed at abating it are—dominate contemporary Amer-
ican politics. On these questions, too, Americans are culturally divided. 
Hierarchs and egalitarians are both concerned about terrorism, but have radically different 
beliefs about where the risk of it comes from and what to do about it. Egalitarians, we found, be-
lieve that the war in Iraq has increased the risk of terrorist attack. Hierarchs reject that claim. 
They supported increasing the number of troops sent to Iraq at the time President Bush’s “surge” 
policy was being implemented, while egalitarians strongly opposed that policy. 
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Individualists aren’t inclined to share the beliefs of hierarchs on terrorism. Their parting of 
the ways on this issue fits the logic of their respective worldviews: believing that terrorism is a 
serious risk is congenial to investing governmental authorities with significant power, a prospect 
that affirms hierarchical sensibilities but that threatens individualist ones. Indeed, individualism 
inclines persons to oppose, hierarchy to support, reintroducing the draft and the warantless wire-
tapping of the telephone communications of U.S. citizens suspected of communicating with ter-
rorists (see regression table in the next section). 
6. Culture, Ideology, and Mass Political Opinion 
The late political scientist Aaron Wildavsky posited that that cultural outlooks of the sort 
featured in the cultural cognition theory are the font of political preferences generally. He there-
fore advocated the use of a two-dimensional, hierarchy-egalitarianism/individualism-
communitarianism framework rather than a one dimensional, liberal-conservative one for ex-
plaining political attitudes and behavior (Wildavsky1987). 
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The Second National Risk and Culture Study generated evidence strongly supportive of 
Wildavsky’s view. On a host of issues—from raising the minimum wage to repealing the estate 
tax; from the provision of universal health care to the imposition of the death penalty; from regu-
lating the possession of firearms at home to increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq—
cultural worldviews explained differences in individuals’ opinions more powerfully than did lib-
eral-conservative ideology. 
 
Explanatory Power of Liberal-Conservative Ideology and Cultural Worldviews, Overall 
and at “Low” Level of Political Knowledge 
 Gun Control  Capital Punishment 
 Overall Low Knowledge  Overall Low Knowledge 
Conservative vs. Liberal -.063*** -.017   .023 -.011 
Individualism vs. Communitarianism -.186*** -.151***   .103***  .137*** 
Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism -.156*** -.175***   .180***  .121*** 
    
 Warrantless Wiretap  Universal Health 
 Overall Low Knowledge  Overall Low Knowledge 
Conservative vs. Liberal  .036 -.051  -.095*** -.024 
Individualism vs. Communitarianism -.063*** -.022  -.111*** -.012 
Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism  .192***  .077*  -.175*** -.197*** 
      
 Raising Min. Wage  Repeal Estate Tax 
 Overall Low Knowledge  Overall Low Knowledge 
Conservative vs. Liberal -.079 -.028   .033 -.009 
Individualism vs. Communitarianism -.099***  .061   .147***  .111*** 
Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism -.170*** -.152***   .066***  -.011 
    
 Reintroduce Draft  Iraq Surge 
 Overall Low Knowledge  Overall Low Knowledge 
Conservative vs. Liberal  .029  .037   .071***  .037 
Individualism vs. Communitarianism -.057** -.038   .004 -.002 
Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism  .101***  .115***   .185***  .165*** 
N ≈ 1,450. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10. Dependent variables is support for indicated policy. Coeffi-
cients are semi-partial correlations in multivariate regression controlling for gender, race, income, education, 
and political party affiliation.  
Even more importantly, data from the Second National Risk and Culture Study furnish sup-
port for Wildavsky’s conjectures on the role of culture in orienting mass opinion. It is a staple of 
conventional public opinion research that conventional measures of ideology, such as liberalism-
conservativism, lack the power to explain the opinion of most members of the public, who pre-
sumably lack the time and aptitude to deduce policy positions from abstract principles. Wil-
davsky hypothesized that such persons are guided instead by cultural cues—primarily the mean-
ings policies express, and the positions espoused by culturally like-minded peers. Consistent with 
Wildavsky’s position, the National Risk and Culture Study found that on a host of issues cultural 
orientations, but not political ideologies, explain the views of persons of low levels of political 
sophistication. 
Second National Risk and Culture Study Page 16 
Conclusion 
There is a culture war in America, but it is about facts, not values. There is very little evi-
dence that most Americans care nearly as much about issues that symbolize competing cultural 
values as they do about the economy, national security, and the safety and health of themselves 
and their loved ones. There is ample evidence, however, that Americans are sharply divided 
along cultural lines about what sorts of conditions endanger these interests and what sorts of pol-
icies effectively counteract such risks. 
Findings from the Second National Culture and Risk Study help to show why. Psychologi-
cally speaking, it’s much easier to believe that conduct one finds dishonorable or offensive is 
dangerous, and conduct one finds noble or admirable is socially beneficial, than vice versa. Peo-
ple are also much more inclined to accept information about risk and danger when it comes from 
someone who shares their values than when it comes from someone who holds opposing com-
mitments. 
Researchers associated with the Cultural Cognition Project believe that cultural polarization 
arising from these types of influences is unfortunate. Most Americans believe the goal of law is 
to secure society’s collective well-being, not to declare winners and losers among persons who 
subscribe to different cultural outlooks. Nevertheless, because of the decisive influence of their 
worldviews on their risk perceptions, such people end up drawn into divisive forms of cultural 
conflict nevertheless as they deliberate about what sorts of polices will best promote their com-
mon ends.  
The Second National Risk and Culture Study identifies conditions that help to ameliorate 
this state of affairs. When policies are framed in ways that affirm rather than threaten citizens’ 
cultural values, people are less likely to dismiss information that runs contrary to their prior be-
liefs. They are also more willing to weigh and reflect on such information in an environment in 
which they can see that others who share their values find that information credible.  
These findings can be used to structure risk communication and policymaking. The goal 
wouldn’t be to move people toward one set of beliefs or another on a disputed issue (such as gun 
control, or global warming, or mandatory HPV vaccination). Rather it would be to neutralize the 
tendency of people to polarize along cultural lines as they consider information. Disagreements 
about facts would no doubt persist, but they would no longer take the form of battles between 
rival cultural factions. 
Much work remains to be done, however, to formulate risk-communication and policymak-
ing strategies of this sort. Armed with increased knowledge about how values shape beliefs about 
risk, researchers should now energetically apply themselves to identifying deliberative process 
that make it possible to fashion regulatory policies that are both consistent with sound scientific 
data and congenial to persons of diverse cultural outlooks.  
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Appendix A. Study Sample and Methods 
Study subjects consisted of a nationally representative general population sample of ap-
proximately 5,000 Americans. Initially, the cultural values of all subjects were measured using 
two scales corresponding to “Hierarchy-Egalitarianism” and “Individualism-
Communitarianism,” respectively (Kahan et al. 2007a). Individuals drawn from the resulting 
“subject pool” were thereafter used as subjects for particular surveys and experiments, which 
were conducted at various points between late December 2006 and early September 2007. 
Subjects participated in these surveys and experiments through the on-line testing facili-
ties of Knowledge Networks (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/). Knowledge Networks is a 
public opinion research firm with offices located throughout the United States. It maintains an 
active respondent pool of some 40,000 persons who are recruited to participate in on-line surveys 
and experiments administered on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and private 
businesses. Knowledge Network respondents agree to participate in three to four surveys per 
month in exchange for Internet access and other forms of compensation. It uses recruitment and 
sampling methods that assure a diverse sample that is demographically representative of the U.S. 
population. Numerous studies have found that on-line testing of Knowledge Network samples 
generates results equivalent in their reliability conventional live testing methods, including ran-
dom-digit-dial surveys (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html). Studies us-
ing Knowledge Networks facilities are routinely published in peer-reviewed academic journals 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/List%20of%20Journals%208-28-2006.pdf). 
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